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Abstract 
As mortgage defaults and foreclosures continued to climb, the severe strains that started to 
plague credit markets in the middle of 2007 worsened further. Losses on housing-related 
securities and derivative instruments continued to climb, causing substantial damage to the 
balance sheets of large financial institutions that had levered up on these same securities. As 
their positions worsened, banks found it increasingly difficult to attract funding that wasn’t 
priced at exorbitantly high rates or for very short terms. Term funding markets, specifically 
those that centered on agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), quickly dried up as fears 
of illiquidity and even insolvency spread. To remedy these concerns, the Federal Reserve  
announced a program called the Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreements, which 
auctioned off repurchase agreements (repos) to primary Dealers every week. This provided 
a critical source of funding to these institutions, which, at the time, could not access other 
avenues of funding, such as the discount window. The repos were short term, priced at 
market rates, and matured 28 days after the settlement date. Of the 20 institutions 
categorized as primary dealers at the beginning of 2008, 19 participated in the program, 
which had auctions running from March 7, 2008, to December 31, 2008. Usage peaked at, but 
never exceeded, $80 billion per month, though the Fed said in its initial press release that 
the program’s size could have gone up to $100 billion. While the program was smaller 
compared to other market liquidity initiatives, ST OMO operated at capacity for most of its 
duration, and spreads between agency MBS repo and Treasury repo rates fell dramatically 
toward the end of the issuance window.  
Keywords: ST OMO, market liquidity programs, market liquidity, interbank lending, credit 
markets, repurchase agreements, repos
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 







At a Glance  
 
 On March 7, 2008, the Federal Reserve  announced the 
Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreements facility, a 
set of single-tranche open market operations (ST OMO) 
that were designed to alleviate severe liquidity-related 
stresses on the interbank lending market, particularly 
with respect to agency mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS). The program, which used Section 14 of the 
Federal Reserve Act as its legal basis, had primary 
dealers participate in a series of auctions of 28-day 
repurchase agreements (repos) to provide an additional 
mechanism for short-term funding. These institutions 
did not have access to facilities like the discount 
window, and thus their access to lender-of-last resort 
facilities was limited. In order to obtain repo funding, 
dealers also had to pledge collateral in the event they 
would be unable to pay the agreement back.   
Eligible collateral included (1) Treasury securities, (2) 
federal agency debt, and (3) mortgage-backed securities 
that were issued or guaranteed by federal agencies. ST 
OMO was primarily just a series of modified 
conventional open market operations that the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) routinely 
conducted, with the primary difference being that 
normal repos had several tranches that were priced 
differently based on the riskiness of the underlying 
collateral. ST OMO, however, had only one tranche, thus allowing riskier collateral to be utilized at a lower 
effective rate. This was most notably seen with agency MBS, which was seen as the riskiest type of OMO 
collateral and was used heavily in the auctions. 
The auctions began on March 7, 2008, with the first repo agreement settling on March 10. Of the 20 institutions 
categorized as primary dealers, 19 participated in the auctions. The auctions were conducted at market rates, 
which ranged from an average of about 280 bps for the set of auctions on March 7, 2008, to an average of 8 bps 
for those on December 31 2008. A total of 375 auctions were conducted over the program’s issuance window, 
totaling $855 billion in trade value. From April 30 to the expiration of the program’s issuance window on 
December 31, 2008, there were $80 billion in repurchase agreements outstanding, indicating considerable 
primary dealer participation. 
 
Summary Evaluation 
In general, there was minimal formal evaluation done for ST OMO. It is possible that the program was used as 
a signaling device in an attempt to destigmatize participation in some of the traditional facilities, especially 
since most of the collateral pledged was mortgage backed securities. The program was fairly small and was 
announced around the same time as other programs like the Term Auction Facility (TAF), Term Securities 
Lending Facility (TSLF), and Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF). Some suggest that, based on the 
consistently capped usage and falling repo rates as ST OMO wound down, the program was a success for the 
institutions that used it most. However, others suggest a limited US impact, since the biggest borrowers were 
foreign institutions such as Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and BNP Paribas. 
  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To address heightened liquidity-related 
pressures in term funding and mortgage funding 
markets 
Announcement Date  March 7, 2008 
Operational Date March 7, 2008 
Date of First 
Issuance 
March 10, 2008 
Issuance Window 
Expiration Date 
December 31, 2008 
Program Size Approx. $100 billion per 
month 
Usage  $80 billion per week at 
peak 
Outcomes Single-tranche rate 
spreads fell from more 
than 180 basis points to 
less than 10 bps by 
January 2009; one-month 
agency MBS repo rates 
declined dramatically 
following announcement 
Federal Reserve Single-Tranche Term 
Repurchase Agreements 
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Single-Tranche Repo:  United States Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$47,976 in 2007 





rating (5-year senior 
debt) 
 



















Size of banking 
system 
 
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking 
system as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
62.9% in 2007 




Size of banking 




Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of 
financial system in 2007 
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of 
financial system in 2008 
 




of banking system 
 
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




in banking system 
22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




ownership of banking 
system 
 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey 
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Existence of deposit 
insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 
for 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 
for 2008 
 










By the end of 2007, signs of increasing stress on the financial system continued to grow 
worse. Corporate bond spreads and interbank lending spreads skyrocketed, suggesting the 
beginning of a freeze in lending and credit markets. The spread between the London 
interbank offered rate (Libor) and the overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate, often used as a 
proxy for counterparty credit risk in the banking system, spiked dramatically in the second 
half of 2007 from less than 20 basis points (bps) to nearly 80 bps after the first quarter of 
2008. Additionally, the spread between one-month agency mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) and Treasuries of the same maturity skyrocketed to almost 140 basis points by March 
2008 (English and Mosser 2018).  
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Figure 2: One-Month Agency MBS Repo to One-Month Treasury Repo (bps) 
 
Source: FRBNY Primary Dealer Survey. 
Mortgage funding markets especially continued to slow, and funding became harder to 
access, particularly for banks that were the most exposed to the housing downturn. Primary 
dealers, which are large financial institutions that trade with the Federal Reserve in order to 
implement monetary policy, were particularly vulnerable. Primary dealers were not eligible 
for existing term funding programs such as the Term Auction Facility (TAF), and thus had 
less access. As such, the Federal Reserve decided to preempt the potential damage by issuing 
a series of expansive, slightly modified open market operations under Section 14 of the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (FRA).   
Program Description 
The precipitous spike in mortgage defaults caused tranches of several types of mortgage-
backed securities to become worthless, spreading fear regarding the creditworthiness of 
those institutions that were most exposed. To combat this, the Federal Reserve announced 
on March 7, 2008, a set of wide-ranging single-tranche open market operations (ST OMO) to 
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ST OMO was authorized under Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act and was administered 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).   
In its initial announcement, the Federal Reserve specified that it expected program 
participation to peak at about $100 billion per month, and that, as in traditional repurchase 
agreements (repos), a series of auctions would be used (FRBNY 008). Of the 20 institutions 
categorized as primary dealers at the beginning of 2008, 19 participated to varying degrees. 
Primary dealers were not required to participate, but they were mandated to connect their 
systems to the auctions in acknowledgement of the process.  
This was not the first time that the Fed had used single-tranche repo operations to address 
issues in term funding markets. They had done so in the 1990s, following the events of 
September 11, 2001, and on August 10, 2007, as conditions worsened following BNP Paribas’ 
freezing of $2.2 billion of funds due to an inability to value US subprime mortgage securities. 
(English and Mosser 2018; Kar-Gupta and Le Guernigou 2007). Additionally, traditional 
repos and open market operations were used to control the federal funds rate by increasing 
the levels of reserves in the banking system. In ST OMO, however, the purpose was much 
different. Due to the continued and increasingly acute strain in term funding markets, the 
single-tranche open market operations functioned more as an extension of conventional 
lender-of-last-resort facilities, rather than as a part of standard monetary Fed policy.  
Normally, these varying types of collateral were spread throughout several tranches, with 
the price of the repo being determined by the quality of the collateral. The types of securities 
that were eligible as collateral, in order of least risky to most, were: (1) Treasury securities, 
(2) federal agency debt, and (3) mortgage-backed securities that were issued or guaranteed 
by federal agencies. The first (and least risky) tranche would use the collateral seen as the 
least risky, the second with the next least, et cetera. As ST OMO’s name implies, these same 
types of collateral were eligible for use in the sole tranche to help bring down the effective 
rate of borrowing and increase liquidity for less liquid, riskier collateral, namely agency MBS. 
The first auctions, which ran weekly, were conducted on March 7, 2008, and settled on March 
10, 2008. Each of the agreements, with the exception of two (at 23 days), had 28 day terms.3 
The auctions, which were held at market rates, had spreads between the stop-out rate and 
one-month OIS stay near zero from April to the beginning of September. Additionally, there 
were no individual caps placed on any one primary dealer’s participation, nor were there 
any minimums required. The Federal Reserve continued its sets of weekly auctions 
throughout 2008, with the final one taking place on December 31, 2008. The last of these 
repos expired on January 28, 2009, and no new ST OMO auctions were conducted 
subsequently.  
Outcomes 
ST OMO, along with other programs implemented in March 2008, was the start of the Fed’s 
heightened awareness of the growing intensity of the financial crisis. While the specific 
justification that the Federal Reserve cited was to address liquidity concerns in mortgage 
and term funding markets, it could be that the decision to use these single-tranche repo 
agreements was a signal by the Fed to destigmatize the participation in repo auctions and 
other lender-of-last-resort facilities, especially since the lion’s share of pledged collateral 
was agency MBS.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
3 Both BNP Paribas and Credit Suisse settled one 23-day single-tranche repo each on April 7, 2008, for $6 billion 
and $9 billion, respectively. 
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In the first few weeks of auctions through March and April 2008, approximately $65 billion 
of credit was outstanding , with 19 dealers participating. By the first week of May, the amount 
outstanding had risen to $80 billion, and it stayed at that level until the issuance window 
closed on December 31, 2008. The vast majority of the repurchase agreements were used by 
large, foreign banks that had substantial holdings in the USA. From July 23, 2008, to 
December 9, 2008, foreign primary dealers held anywhere from 81% to 98% of the 
outstanding single-tranche agreements. 4  This shows an unintended consequence of the 
program, as US-based primary dealers drew on the facility much less despite it being a US-
specific intervention. In fact, the three largest single-tranche auction participants—Credit 
Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and BNP Paribas—were all foreign based. 
While Bear Stearns was one of the dealers that participated in the program, it also received 
substantial aid in the form of assistance by the FRBNY, which created a vehicle to buy $30 
billion of Bear’s bad assets to help facilitate its acquisition by JPMorgan Chase. Bear used ST 
OMO only once before being acquired, settling an auction on March 11, 2008, for $500 
million.  
While the Federal Reserve released aggregate auction results, it did not reveal how much 
each bank used until July 2011. Over the program’s nearly 10-month issuance window, $855 
billion in gross transaction value from 375 transactions was issued. Though 19 primary 
dealers participated in the program, eight of them made up approximately $745 billion, or 
87% of the total amount traded at the auctions.5 Some institutions, such as Credit Suisse, had 
far greater usage than most of its counterparts. The Swiss bank was involved in more than 
$259 billion in ST OMO auctions over the program’s lifespan. On the opposite end of the 
spectrum, HSBC participated in much fewer auctions, at just $152 million. Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, RBS, and Barclays were the top five dealers to participate.See 











4  Calculated by dividing the amount ST OMO credit that foreign banks were holding by the total amount 
outstanding for each week beginning on July 23, 2008, and ending on December 9, 2008. 
5 The eight banks were Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., BNP Paribas Securities 
Corporation, RBS Securities Inc., Barclays Capital Inc., UBS Securities LLC, Goldman, Sachs & Company, and 
Morgan Stanley & Company Inc. 
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Figure 3: Total Single-Tranche Auction Participation, by Primary Dealer (USD billions) 
 
Note: Seven other primary dealers participated in the auctions in smaller capacities. Their 
approximate participation was as follows: Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., $7.93 billion; Citigroup 
Global Markets Inc., $7.70 billion; Dresdner Kleinwort Securities LLC, $5.26 billion; Daiwa 
Securities America Inc., $2.72 billion; J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., $2.50 billion; Bear, Stearns & 
Company, Inc., $500 million; HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., $152 million. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
Collateral used was overwhelmingly agency MBS, as they were seen as the riskiest type of 
collateral and comprised a financing market rife with liquidity issues. (English and Mosser 
2018). From October 8 to December 17, a period when auction rates started sky-high, 89% 
of submitted collateral was mortgage backed securities issued or guaranteed by federal 
agencies (FRBNY 2009). Demand was much larger immediately following the facility’s 
launch. As additional programs such as the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) were introduced, amounts bid at the weekly auctions 
decreased, but the amount of single-tranche repos outstanding still stayed at $80 billion, 
indicating significant demand.  
Agency MBS repo to Treasury repo spreads narrowed rapidly at the end of March as the 
single-tranche operations, along with other facilities, had become operational throughout 




















signaling more problems in repo markets that used agency MBS as collateral. Repo spreads 
would gradually narrow before falling to their pre-Lehman rates by the end of 2008. 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreements were designed to alleviate 
considerable liquidity-related pressures in term funding markets, specifically 
agency MBS.  
However, there were several other programs, such as the TSLF and the PDCF) that were also 
introduced around the same time. All of these programs were designed to alleviate stress on 
various funding markets, specifically term funding, triparty repo, and agency MBS (which ST 
OMO also aimed to address). 
2. Legal authority for the operations came from Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act. 
Unlike other crisis response programs launched in March 2008 that used Section 13(3) as 
their legal basis, ST OMO used Section 14, which was also the basis for the Fed’s conventional 
monetary policy tools, specifically its open market operations. Since ST OMO was not 
radically different from conventional open market operations, it used the same legal 
justification and did not require “unusual or exigent circumstances” as defined in Section 
13(3). The program was immediately implementable because of this. 
3. The program was administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Since this program was essentially a set of wider-ranging open market operations, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which was in charge of conducting all open market 
operations, administered it as well. 
4. The Federal Reserve did not place an explicit cap on the measures but estimated 
that up to $100 billion could be outstanding at any given time. 
However, the amount of outstanding agreements started at $65 billion before rising to $80 
billion per month, or $20 billion per week, until the issuance window closed on December 
31, 2008.  See Figure 4 for more information.  
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Figure 4: Single-Tranche Repurchase Agreements Outstanding (USD billions) 
 
Sources: Federal Reserve Board of Governors; Bloomberg (OIS). 
 
5. All primary dealers were eligible to participate in the program. 
Nineteen of the 20 institutions classified as primary dealers  participated. However, 
institutions were not required to participate, only to acknowledge the auctions by 
connecting their systems. Only one dealer, Greenwich Capital Markets, Inc., did not 
participate.  
6. Treasury debt, agency debt, and mortgage-backed securities were all eligible to be 
used as collateral. 
These were usable as collateral for normal repo agreements. However, each type of security 
was allowed to be used for only one of the three tranches in a typical repo. For ST OMO, all 
three types could be pledged to the same (and only) tranche. This was done because it was 
likely that the majority of assets pledged as collateral would be agency MBS (Hilton 2008). 
Under a conventional three-tranche agreement, agency MBS used as collateral would, due to 
their riskiness and less-liquid nature relative to Treasuries and agency debt, demand a 
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the same tranche lowered the effective rate paid by most borrowers and injected liquidity 
into a market that, by March 2008, was almost frozen.  
7. The repo agreements had 28-day terms. 
However, there were two auctions that had 23-day terms.6 
8. There do not appear to have been a cap on dealers’ participation, and there were 
no minimum amounts required. 
However, the Federal Reserve expected no more than $100 billion dollars of agreements 
would be outstanding at any one time.  
9.  Auctions were conducted at market rates. 
At the start of the program, stop-out rates were, on average, 280 bps, then hovered around 
220 bps from May 2008 to the middle of September. However, spreads between single-
tranche stop-out rates and the one-month OIS rate stayed relatively low before the 
bankruptcy of Lehman on September 15 caused them to shoot up, peaking at more than 181 
bps the week of October 8. By the final set of auctions, the stop-out rate had fallen below the 
one-month OIS rate, thus leading to negative spreads.  Stop-out rates ranged from nearly 380 
bps to just 1 bp for select auctions during the program’s lifespan.   
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143




10.  Auctions ran weekly from March 7, 2008, to December 31, 2008.  
Conventional repo and reverse repo agreements, also conducted via auction, often had terms 
that would stretch anywhere from overnight to 65 days, though shorter-term, normally 
overnight, agreements were far more common. 
III. Evaluation 
ST OMO was not given much attention nor formal evaluation. It was simply a set of open 
market operations done under a lender-of-last-resort pretense rather than as part of 
conventional monetary policy. This led to two important distinctions. First, that the funding 
term for ST OMO repos was longer than for conventional repurchase agreements. Repo and 
reverse repo agreements conducted in normal times most commonly had overnight terms, 
with the longest term allowed normally being 65 days. Second, the single-tranche aspect of 
the program allowed agency MBS to be put up as collateral at a lower effective rate despite 
their underlying risk, thus providing much-needed funding to considerably strained term 
funding markets, which had all but frozen. However, since ST OMO was also introduced 
around the same time as many other programs, such as TSLF and the PDCF, it was more 
difficult to disentangle the stand-alone impact it had on term funding markets. 
Michael J. Fleming explained that, while ST OMO had market-determined pricing, which 
appeared to keep auction rates high, the usage of the program and the subsequent decline in 
stop-out rates suggests that the auctions were priced well (Fleming 2012). Certain 
institutions, such as Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, BNP Paribas, Countrywide, and Cantor 
Fitzgerald, had more than half their outstanding credit at the Federal Reserve as single-
tranche repos (Eisenbeis and Herring 2014). Robert Eisenbeis and Richard Herring 
suggested that these five primary dealers, as well as Morgan Stanley, RBS, UBS, Deutsche 
Bank, and Barclays, had a non-negligible amount of ST OMOs outstanding, and thus benefited 
quite a bit. However, for this group of dealers, the authors of the paper stated that ST OMO 
“had negligible impact” (Eisenbeis and Herring 2014). Generally, however, there appears to 
be very limited evaluation on the impact of ST OMO itself, especially compared to TAF, TSLF, 
and PDCF. In spite of its use as a lender-of-last-resort facility, the small size of the program 
($80 billion outstanding at any given time) and standard legal basis may have contributed to 
a relative lack of evaluation, as well.  
Bill English and Trish Mosser discussed some aspects of ST OMO, explaining that, “it was 
simple to announce and implement and was well-understood by the primary dealers, with 
no stigma attached to its use” (English and Mosser 2018). Additionally, since it was an FRA 
Section 14 program and used conventional authority, its implementation was immediate. 
The authors cited an immediate, verifiable positive impact on one-month repo spreads for 
agency MBS, which quickly fell after ST OMO and the other primary dealer programs were 
put in place. Initial demand was quite high for the program but tapered off once other, 
broader facilities were put in place.See Figure 6 for more information.  Finally, they explained 
that, due to the comparatively narrow range of usable collateral, the program was not as 
effective as it could have been in easing term funding market strains (English and Mosser 
2018).   
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Figure 6: Amounts Submitted to Single-Tranche Auctions (left axis, USD billions) and 
Demand Satisfied (right axis, %) 
 
Note: Demand Satisfied is calculated by dividing the total amount submitted by primary 
dealers during a given weekly single-tranche repo auction by the amount accepted by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Thus, it is the weekly proportion of primary dealer demand 
for the facility that was met by the FRBNY. In March 2008, weekly amounts accepted were $15 
billion, and from the end of April to the final auction on December 31, 2008, weekly amounts 
accepted stayed constant at $20 billion per week. 
Source: FRBNY. 
Despite a lack of academic attention, in 2011, the program garnered a fair bit of press in the 
public sphere, most notably in an article written by Bob Ivry. He lambasted the program for 
being “secretive” and containing transaction-level details such as bank-specific participation, 
collateral used, and rates paid, that had not been revealed to anyone in the public sphere 
(Ivry 2011).  
David Altig, executive vice president and director of research at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta, challenged these criticisms, stating that he believed the transactions were not 
secretive, as the FRBNY had issued a press release on March 7, 2008, that specified some of 
the details of ST OMO. Additionally, Altig argued that the press releases, combined with the 
overall auction results (which were published) and the fact that the list of primary dealers 
was readily available, suggested that the program was far from secretive (Altig 2011).  
Well-known financial journalist Felix Salmon mostly sided with Altig in the discussion about 
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than it actually is.” Additionally, he criticized the Fed for not bothering to enhance public 
understanding of the program, explaining that Ivry’s article was the first time that many in 
the public sphere, including then–Representative Barney Frank, found out about the 
program (Salmon 2011).  
While it is true that, in the summer of 2011, the Federal Reserve released transaction-level 
data for many of these programs, including ST OMO, it was forced to do so after being sued 
by Bloomberg reporters in November 2008 under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 
Only after a 16-month legal battle, combined with an appeal that ended with a ruling against 
the Fed, did it release transaction-level data. The reluctance could have been due to a lack of 
desire on the part of the Fed to disclose the information of individual banks that were most 
vulnerable, to avoid stigma against them (Feuer 2010; Ivry and Keoun 2011).  
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